In this blog post, we will examine the background against which Max Weber’s “categories of the sociology of understanding” were established, and explore the significance of concepts such as “subjective meaning,” “understanding,” “ideal types,” “instrumental rationality,” “consistency rationality,” “Gesellschaft relations,” and “mutual understanding relations” within Weber’s sociology.

What is the significance of the “Categories of the Sociology of Understanding”?

Although this essay is currently included in the ‘Essays on the Philosophy of Science’, it was originally written as the methodological and categorical foundation for ‘Economy and Society’. Specifically, Weber completed Part II of ‘Economy and Society’ over the three to four years leading up to World War I; in parallel with this work, he revised only the introductory section and published it as a standalone essay in 1913. This is the essay in question. He then completed the section on conceptual definitions in Part I of ‘Economy and Society’ between 1918 and 1920, following World War I. That section was a final revision of the content covered in this essay. Consequently, each section of this essay corresponds to a respective section in Chapter 1, “Basic Concepts of Sociology,” of Part I of ‘Economy and Society’. In fact, while this is my interpretation based on an examination of the content, I suspect that in its draft stage, this paper may have been directly connected to what is now Part 2, Chapter 1, “Various Laws of Economy and Society and Their Fundamental Relationship,” and Chapter 2, “General Economic Relations of Various Communities (Economy and Society),” in the current ‘Economy and Society’ (4th edition). If so, it would seem that only the first half was published as a separate paper, while the content of the latter half was likely inserted into it as footnotes within, for example, “5. Gesellschaft Relations and Gesellschaft Action.” Furthermore, when these two are combined, one can see that they overlap even more with Part 1, Chapter 1 of ‘Economy and Society’. In this sense, it can be considered justified that Winkelmann, the editor of the fourth edition, moved Chapters 5 and 6—that is, this section, which had been the first part of “Sociology of Law”—to the very beginning of the third edition, designating them as Chapters 1 and 2. Mrs. Marianne, the editor up to the third edition, likely moved this section immediately before “Sociology of Law” because she considered the two to be substantively the same. However, this section differs from “Sociology of Law” in its level of abstraction and serves as a foundational concept not only for “Sociology of Law” but for the entire Part II. This is evident from the fact that content corresponding to this section is found in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part I, and furthermore, that these chapters are placed at the beginning of their respective parts.
This paper can be divided into two parts: Sections 1–3, which discuss the methods of “Sociology of Understanding” in general (the first half), and Sections 4–7, which address foundational concepts (the second half). The first part discusses what “understanding” is and how it should be achieved; in terms of content, it begins with the latter part of “Röscher and Künnis”—specifically, “Künnis and the Problem of Irrationality”—continues through this paper, and finally leads to “The Methodological Foundations of Sociology,” which is the introduction to ‘Economy and Society’. Therefore, this section is invaluable for understanding the unique methodology of Weber’s ‘Sociology’. In contrast, the section in the second half that discusses basic concepts—when considered alongside Part 2, Chapter 1 of ‘Economy and Society’—can be said to be substantively identical to Part 1, Chapter 1. However, a comparison of the two reveals that even when the content is the same, the terminology differs, the same terms are used with slightly different meanings, or the manner of definition varies subtly, making a simple comparison between them impossible. Furthermore, most of the terminology used in the specific topics of sociology in Part 2 follows the terminology of this paper rather than that of Part 1. Therefore, to connect Part 1 and Part 2 and to effectively understand the content of Part 1 while reading Part 2, it is necessary to use the conceptual definitions provided in this paper as a bridge. Having clarified the broader significance of this paper within Weber’s ‘Sociology’, I will now provide a brief substantive analysis, divided into two parts: the first half and the second half.

What do “subjective meaning” and “understanding” mean to Weber?

The fundamental idea behind Weber’s “sociology of understanding” is to understand the “subjective meaning” of human social action and, by integrating it into the causal chain of history, to make our causal understanding of history more complete. Although this can be summarized in a single sentence, to fully grasp it, we must first clarify what “subjective meaning” is and what it means to “understand” it. First, let us examine the term “subjective meaning.” Weber sometimes substitutes the term “Motiv” for it. While this “Motiv” can indeed be translated as “motive,” using the Korean term “motive” might make it easier to understand on one hand, but it also seems likely to give rise to many misunderstandings. I believe we should, as in this paper, stick strictly to the term “subjective meaning.” In other words, “subjective meaning” is neither a “motive” in the sense of a mere “intention” or “purpose” of human behavior, nor is it a “motive” in the sense of a simple instinctual impulse—such as appetite, sexual desire, primitive religious sentiment, or the lust for money. While it encompasses such elements, it has a slightly different connotation. For example, consider what Weber calls “traditional” patterns of behavior. This is a pattern of behavior in which value is found in what has been handed down from the past—precisely because it has been handed down—and people voluntarily seek to follow it. This is by no means a mere habitual repetition but a highly conscious act. Of course, it may become almost unconscious behavior in everyday life, but this occurs only after it has undergone a conscious process of social meaning-making and acquired a certain social significance; in times of crisis, it once again becomes a conscious and self-aware action. If a leader attempts to break with this tradition, he or she will face opposition from members or subordinates. Weber cites this “traditional” consciousness as one of the key elements of “subjective meaning”; when we speak of “motivation,” do we generally associate it with this concept?
Let’s consider another example. “Charismatic rule” is one of the most important concepts in Weber’s “Sociology”—what does “subjective meaning” refer to in this context? “Charisma” refers to extraordinary abilities that transcend everyday perception; the “subjective meaning” in this context is the consciousness in which people believe in and revere the value of such extraordinary abilities and voluntarily follow them. While it would not be wrong to call this a “motive,” it is crucial to note that this is, above all, a conscious and self-aware phenomenon. It is not merely instinctive but involves the attribution of specific meaning on a social scale. Thus, when we speak of “subjective meaning,” we are referring specifically to a conscious meaning. While Weber certainly notes that the boundary between “traditional” or “charismatic”—or, generally speaking, “static or passionate”—actions and mere habitual reactions is fluid, the actual subject of analysis is that which is “meaningful” and “conscious.” This characteristic becomes decisive when discussing other types of “subjective meaning,” such as “value-rational” or “purpose-rational” behavior, which will be explained later.
However, another aspect of “subjective meaning” that must not be overlooked is that it is, above all, social in nature. In other words, subjective “meaning-making” occurs in relation to other people and their actions. Of course, in extreme cases, it is possible to act with “meaning” directed solely toward “nature,” as in the case of Robinson Crusoe; however, what is important above all is what is conceived within human social relationships. That said, “social” does not necessarily mean “collective.” “Subjective meaning” can exist even between just two people. Romantic relationships, for instance, become cumbersome when “subjective meaning” involves three or more people. Nevertheless, when looking at history, it is precisely the instances where a certain “subjective meaning” emerges on a massive, societal scale that are truly noteworthy. Even the “subjective meaning” of a great individual acquires historical significance when it takes such a form—that is, when it finds a resonant audience within a particular social stratum. In his actual analysis, Weber focuses exclusively on such cases. With this in mind, if one insists on using the term “motive,” referring to it as a “social motive”—to avoid the implication of a purely personal feeling—would be an expression closer to Weber’s true intent.
In this regard, I would like to clarify the meaning of Weber’s statement that the “individual” is “the smallest unit of interpretive sociology.” Weber states that he treats the individual and his or her actions as “atoms.” In short, just as in chemistry it is necessary to understand the properties of the atom—the fundamental unit—in order to elucidate the properties of various substances, so too, to elucidate the meaning of human behavior as a massive social phenomenon, one must understand the “subjective meaning” of the individual, who is the fundamental unit. The reason the individual must serve as the unit is that “the purpose of the inquiry is to understand,” and therefore, “the individual is the sole agent of meaningful action.” Consequently, just as elucidating the properties of atoms is not an end in itself in chemistry, the goal of interpretive sociology is ultimately to elucidate human behavior as a social phenomenon. In a certain sense, Weber’s way of thinking is certainly “individualistic.” However, if this method is called “individualistic” in the sense that it breaks things down to the level of the individual, then Marx—who argues that we must trace back to “the many individuals who produce” and “start from there”—would also have to be called “individualistic.” Just as Marx cannot be called “individualistic” for that reason alone, Weber, too, cannot simply be called “individualistic”—at least with regard to this method of “understanding.”
Having explained the “subjective meaning” above, I would now like to consider what it means to “understand” this “subjective meaning” and by what method this is achieved. The practice of focusing on the human “subject” and “inner self,” as Weber did, is a characteristic feature of the German Historical School, and it must be said that Weber’s “sociology of understanding” also developed within this tradition. The fact that he continued to place great importance on the human inner world and the spiritual realm—even while confronting and criticizing it—demonstrates, in this sense as well, that Weber was a “son of the Historical School.” Therefore, I believe the clearest way to understand the uniqueness of Weber’s “understanding” is to first examine his critique of the Historical School’s conception of “understanding.”
First, let us consider why the Historical School takes the human “inner world” as its subject. As is well known, the Historical School emerged as a reaction against the “law-based view of history”—that is, the naturalism of the Classical School—yet, surprisingly for a school of its kind, it acknowledges the law-like determinism of nature and historical conditions within which humans act. Weber describes this as a naturalistic way of thinking that has not been overcome “because of historicism.” In any case, if we put it that way, when faced with “external” lawful necessity, where did the Historical School extend a helping hand? It was toward “the human inner self.” It is precisely there that we find the “individual” and “creative” elements of personality—which stand in contrast to the “mechanical” causality of “nature”—as well as “free will” and “human dignity.” As can be easily imagined by observing the way in which “human will” and “creativity” are set against the given “law-governed determinism”—including that of “external” forces, “nature,” including history—with “human free will” or “creativity.” As one can easily imagine from this approach, the inner self of humanity—expressed as “free will”—was regarded by the Historical School as incalculable and irrational. In other words, they set the inner irrationality against the external regularity and rationality, and in doing so, sought to rescue the individual’s “freedom” and “dignity” from a “law-based determinism” that they found intolerable.
Therefore, as long as the human “inner world” is regarded as irrational in this sense and deemed impossible to grasp through “laws” or “concepts,” the method of understanding it cannot help but be irrational as well. For example, this means one has no choice but to rely on Dilthey’s method of “re-experience” (the act of accepting another’s experience as one’s own), Lipps’s method of “empathy,” or Croce’s method of “intuition”; in extreme cases, it even means one has no choice but to adopt the methods of Münsterberg and Goetter, who rely on “experience” itself. If that were the case, “understanding” would become a highly personal matter, inevitably dependent on an individual’s capacity for sensitivity, and would, in principle, be no different from artistic appreciation. For the Historical School, “understanding” was generally understood in this way.
So, what criticism did Weber level against this? First, as explained above, we can see that the Historical School’s view of human nature was directly linked to their value system, and that “inner irrationality” was regarded as the very reason for human existence and the essence of human value. Weber criticized this line of thought on two fronts: one concerns this “irrational” view of human nature, and the other concerns the related method of “understanding.” According to Weber, the “belief that human action or human personality is particularly irrational” is mistaken. If we understand the term “irrationality” in its everyday sense as “incalculability,” then in this respect there is no fundamental distinction between human action and natural events, since both encompass elements of rationality and irrationality. The problem lies in thinking, as Künis does, that “free will” and “rationality” are inversely proportional. On the contrary, as “free will”—that is, the freedom of action—increases, so too will the rationality and comprehensibility of action increase to the same degree. Thus, Weber believed that human action is all the more rational and comprehensible the more “free” and conscious it is, and that this is why a science dedicated to human action can be established. Thus, we can see that underlying Weber’s “interpretive sociology” is what might be called a “rational view of human nature”—not that this view denies the irrational aspects of human nature or excludes them from the realm of “understanding,” but it does form the foundation of his theory.
However, this did not mean that proving such a view of human nature was the goal of science, nor did it mean that the “understanding” of human behavior was an end in itself. It was, after all, merely a procedure and a means for elucidating the unique causal relationships of history—not a “principle” or “method” intended to replace them. The fact that the text frequently emphasizes that “understanding” requires hypotheses and their verification in the same way as causal attribution—and that it has meaning only as part of causal attribution—should also be understood within the context described above.
Next, the second point of criticism Weber raises concerns the method of this “understanding.” As already mentioned, the “understanding” of the Historical School was in fact dependent on personal sensibilities derived from “intuition,” “re-experiencing,” and “empathy”; Weber argues that for history to be a science, it must not rely on such irrational methods but, above all, adopt a method based on conceptual construction. In other words, it must first undergo conceptual processing—that is, it must be “understood” through a rational method. For example, he states the following: “The amateurish view that history is merely a reproduction of empirical intuition or an imitation of past experiences—whether those of the individual himself or of others—is completely mistaken. Even one’s own experience is no longer merely imitated once one attempts to grasp it through reason,” he states in ‘Röscher and Kunis’. Thus, the use of the “ideal type” is required even in the process of “understanding.”

How does the “ideal type” serve as a criterion for understanding?

“Understanding” based on the “ideal type” can generally be described as follows. First, the construction of the “ideal type” is achieved by extracting the most rational element from “subjective meaning”—and thus the most rational action—and “purifying” it. Fundamentally, irrational elements are situated by comparison with this ideal type. Specifically, there are several types even among irrational elements, and by using each “ideal type” as a yardstick, it becomes clear whether a given element is a mixture of these—that is, an intermediate form—with “rationality” fundamentally serving as the central yardstick.
For example, based on “economy and society,” the “subjective meanings” of action first yield the “purpose-rational” and the “value-rational,” followed by the irrational “traditional” and “emotional” types. More specifically, the former manifests as “bureaucratic rule” or “legitimate rule,” while the latter manifests as “patriarchal rule,” “patrimonial rule,” or “charismatic rule.” In the sociology of religion, two rational ideal types are fundamentally established: the ethical rationality of ascetic Protestantism and the rationality of Hindu mysticism; the aim is to “understand” other religious practices through comparison with these. It is important to note here that, as this approach makes clear, the object of Weber’s “understanding” is by no means limited to what is “rational.” Rather, in actual historical developments, the irrational plays a significant role; this stems from Weber’s view of history, which holds that the irrational exerts a decisive influence on historical progress. In short, while the method is thoroughly rational, its subject matter is by no means limited to the rational. Rather, it actively engages with the irrational. The reason Weber cannot accept the “experiences” of Gutter and others as science is not because they deal with the irrational. Rather, he criticizes them for not having undergone conceptual processing. The method of recognizing the individual after first passing through conceptual and law-based understanding—this is the very essence of Weber’s “ideal type,” and this method is clearly upheld in “interpretive sociology” as well.
Thus far, I have explained the fundamental ideas of Weber’s “sociology of understanding.” First, I clarified that even when referring to an “inner” understanding, the meaning of that “inner” aspect differs significantly from that of the Historical School, and that the object of study is “subjective meaning” that carries social rather than personal significance. Next, I explained that the method is conceptual, based on “ideal types,” and mediated by conceptual processing. In the text, Weber states that if the subjective meaning of human action is referred to as “the inner side of human action,” then the sociology of interpretation can be described as a discipline that observes from “the inner side”; however, he adds the caveat that “the term ‘inner side’ is, admittedly, a dangerous one.” From the explanation above, it should be clear that this term is indeed a dangerous one, prone to misunderstanding.

What does “instrumental rationality” mean?

So far, I have provided a general explanation of what “understanding” means in Weber’s context; next, I would like to briefly explain several fundamental concepts of Weber’s “sociology.” This is precisely the focus of the latter part of this paper. As mentioned in Commentary 1, several terminological changes can be observed from Part 1 to Part 2 of ‘Economy and Society’ depending on the time of writing; therefore, it will be helpful to discuss the relationships between these various concepts while keeping the content of this paper in mind.
First, I would like to clarify the meanings of terms that Weber uses abruptly without providing much detail. These are “instrumental rationality” and “consistency rationality.” Regarding “instrumental rationality” first, a definition closely resembling the one in this essay does appear. Specifically, an “instrumentally rational” action refers to “an action carried out in a subjectively rigorous and rational manner, using means that are (subjectively) deemed appropriate for achieving a (subjectively) unambiguously identified goal.” However, this definition is highly insufficient, and it cannot be considered complete on its own for understanding the main text. Because this definition focuses on the contrast with “consistently rational” behavior, it emphasizes the “subjective” aspect; consequently, the relationship between the goal and the means—specifically that the means are “unambiguously suitable”—and the fact that the behavior is carried out “rationally” are described as separate matters, so the relationship between them cannot be said to be sufficiently clarified. Admittedly, this is sufficient for the examples of religion presented in the first part, but as we move into the latter part, it is helpful to have some prior knowledge.
Next, let’s examine the definition of “economics and society.” There, it is defined as “purpose-rational in the sense of anticipating the behavior of external objects or the behavior of others, and utilizing these anticipations as conditions or means for one’s own purposes—which are rationally pursued and considered as consequences” (WuG, p. 12). As can be seen from this, it is the method of selecting means for an end that is rational; the earlier mention of selecting means “appropriately” does not mean that one will resort to any means whatsoever—in a “by any means necessary” manner—to achieve the end. In other words, in order to choose means rationally for the sake of an end, one must have certain “expectations” regarding the actions of others, and unless those “expectations” have a certain degree of probability of being realized, it would not be possible to determine the means rationally. Therefore, in this case, the actions of others must also be rational and predictable. The actions of others are predictable, first, when a free and rational market exists, and second, when a rational legal system is in place. Thus, Weber’s concept of “purpose rationality” represents a phenomenon that is uniquely characteristic of the modern era. In short, “instrumental rationality” means pursuing a goal while taking into account the rational relationships in one’s surroundings—allowing for accurate, rational expectations or predictions regarding them—and considering these factors rationally; it does not mean simply calculating and selecting means relentlessly for the sake of the goal. However, since the passage explaining this using the example of religion in general does not use the term in this strict sense, one must be careful not to become confused. As Weber entered his later years, he came to use the term strictly in this sense; therefore, keeping the above point in mind while reading the latter part of the text will make it easier to understand.

What does “consistency rationality” mean?

Next is “consistency rationality,” or the “consistency type.” This is a concept with many unclear aspects, and the term is never used in any of his writings other than this essay. Moreover, even within this essay, nothing resembling a definition ever appears. This is entirely uncharacteristic of Weber. Perhaps he intended to write a separate section defining the concept outside of this essay. However, this term does not appear even once in Part 1 of ‘Economy and Society’, written later, nor in Part 2, which followed shortly thereafter. Does this mean that such content does not exist at all? Certainly not. In my view, it is used in several places and is, in fact, explained in detail. Although I cannot fully understand the reason for this at present, it may be that he considered the term ‘richtig’ unsuitable for expressing this concept, yet was unable to find a suitable alternative.
As for the meaning of this term, it refers—from an objective, third-party perspective—primarily to what is logically coherent and valid. For example, since legal hermeneutics is considered one of the classic examples of logical consistency, let us first take this as an example. Although the term “richtig” appears only a few times in ‘Economy and Society’, one passage reads as follows: “Juridical—or, more precisely, legal-hermeneutical—considerations set forth the following task: Namely, it is the task of investigating the consistent (richtig) meaning of the various propositions expressed in the content of a rule—which can be considered decisive for the behavior of a certain group of people—that is, the various constituent elements upon which those propositions are based and the manner in which those constituent elements serve as the foundation for the propositions. In this case, the examination is conducted in the following manner. That is, the examination seeks to define the various individual propositions of this nature—which are grounded in their own certain empirical validity—according to a logically coherent (logisch richtig) meaning in which these propositions are logically assembled into a system that is free from internal contradiction. It is stated that “this system is a legal rule in the legal-linguistic sense.”
The “logically consistent” system described here is the “consistency model” Weber had in mind. In addition, Weber cites logic, aesthetics, normative ethics, mathematics, and theology. These are all forms of conceptual-analytical dogmatics, distinct from the empirical sciences. Let us take an example from religion—another important domain for understanding Weber. It is the mystical Indian religion mentioned in the text. Although Hinduism and Buddhism are mystical and not easily understood by us, Weber argues that there is still a certain rationality underlying them. What is this rationality? It is ethical rationality. In other words, Hinduism and Buddhism possess their own worldviews and, based on these, the doctrines of reincarnation and karma (Karmanlehre); these doctrines possess a consistent logical coherence in and of themselves. And this coherence is something we, too, can understand. Therefore, the behavior of Hindu and Buddhist believers—who act in accordance with these teachings in harmony with that coherence—can be understood indirectly, even if not directly or through emotional empathy, by grasping the objectively coherent and rational nature of those teachings. The same can be said of the behavior of Protestants who believe in predestination, as well as of Confucianism. This is why, in Weber’s ‘The Sociology of Religion’, an examination of “doctrine” plays a crucial role for any religion. In other words, it can be considered an indispensable element in understanding the subjective intentions of believers.

What do “Gesellschaft relations” and “mutual understanding relations” mean?

Finally, I would like to briefly explain “Gesellschaft relations” and “mutual understanding relations.” I believe that simply reading the main text will be sufficient to understand “Gesellschaft relations.” In short, purpose-rational social relations are explained, using “associations” as a typical example. What is particularly noteworthy here is that the existence of “laws”—especially rational “statutory laws”—is considered the foundation of rational relations. This is a noteworthy point, especially when one considers that the presence or absence of “laws” is not an issue in the definition provided in Part I of ‘Economy and Society’.
Next is the “relationship of mutual understanding.” Weber’s explanation here is quite circuitous, making it difficult to grasp the core of his argument, but what he is trying to say is this: First, in the introduction, he states that there are “social actions where, even in the absence of a rule, one can expect the same results as when a rule is present.” He cites the “market” and the “language community” as examples. However, arguing that this definition alone is insufficient for sociologically identifying a particular type of action, he offers the following definition: namely, even “in the absence of an agreement (a rationally established rule),” a certain “understanding” exists; moreover, because this “understanding” possesses a certain “empirical effectiveness,” one can expect the same results as if an “agreement”—that is, a rule—were in place. This relationship is defined as a “relationship of mutual understanding.” In other words, Weber did not abandon the first definition but rather redefined it in terms of the empirical effectiveness of “mutual understanding”—that is, “the possibility of mutual understanding.” The core element of the original definition—“the absence of rational norms”—is maintained throughout.
However, when we consider what Weber specifically had in mind regarding this “relationship of mutual understanding,” it can be said that he was thinking of various types of “domination”—specifically, relationships of irrational “domination.” Furthermore, this irrational “domination” can be broadly divided into two forms; in Part I of ‘Economy and Society’, these are described as “affective” and “traditional,” and it is noteworthy that this classification already appears in this paper.
First, Weber presents a form of human bonding based on “affection”—a kind of “understanding”—using examples such as “friendship” and “romantic relationships.” In the terminology of ‘The Sociology of Domination’, this corresponds to “charismatic domination.” However, in the case of “charismatic domination,” it refers to a relationship of “emotional domination” based on particularly intense “affection” among various forms of “affection.” Although the term “charisma” does not appear in this paper, the specific example of a “community centered around a prophet” corresponds to this.
Second, what corresponds to “traditional” domination is a certain mutual understanding based on the “empirical effectiveness” of “customary law,” among other factors. Of course, there is no need for “customary law” per se; any form of “traditional” mutual understanding will suffice. Concrete examples include the “family community” and “patrilineal” political organizations.
However, one peculiar aspect is that the term “understanding” does not appear even once in the section defining concepts in Part 1 of “Economy and Society.” Does this mean that the content expressed by this term has disappeared? Absolutely not. That content is expressed by the term “Gemeinschaft relations.” Moreover, not only has the terminology changed, but the method of definition has also undergone a significant shift. Specifically, “Gemeinschaft relations” are defined as “social relations that occur when the manner in which social actions take place is based on a static or traditional sense of shared belonging subjectively felt by the participants, and refers to social relations within that scope.” In other words, it can be said that the “mutual understanding” among people belonging to “Gemeinschaft” has become clearer as a “subjectively felt sense of shared belonging.” I believe this change has resulted in a definition that strikes at the very core of premodern “Gemeinschaft” relationships. The content of this paper can be regarded as one step toward reaching that point. As a side note, specific examples of “Gemeinschaft relationships” include “spirit-worshiping religious communities, erotic relationships, Pietist relationships, national Gemeinschaft, military units formed by comradeship, and, as a suitable example, family Gemeinschaft.”

What significance do “categories of interpretive sociology” hold in Weber’s sociology?

As can be seen from the explanation above, this essay differs significantly in character from the other essays included in ‘Essays on the Theory of Science’. While the other essays—whether addressing the issue of “value neutrality” or discussing historical methods—can be said to deal with general and abstract content, this essay, in contrast, directly builds upon the content of Weber’s major works, ‘Economy and Society’ and ‘Essays in the Sociology of Religion’. In other words, it explains the methodology of his “sociology” and the various key concepts employed therein. Consequently, its content was written with the ideas in these two major works in mind, and it can be considered one of the foundational texts that must be consulted—along with the conceptual definitions in Part I of ‘Economy and Society’—when studying Weber’s “sociology.”